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1 Introduction
Expectations take center stage in macroeconomics and policymaking. Having acknowledged
their importance in the most emphatic of ways, the US Federal Reserve recently started
publishing its own forecasts of its own interest rate. But, even though recent empirical
work (e.g. Beaudry and Portier (2006), Beaudry and Lucke (2010), Barsky and Sims (2011,
2012), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012), Blanchard et al. (2012)) documents that shocks to
expectations indeed contribute significantly to economic fluctuations, the exact way they do
so, what drives them, or how they can be handled, remain open questions.
The answers might still be debatable, yet there is something everyone agrees on: when
the public overestimates the economy’s potential, the economy booms at the cost of inflation.
A recent literature (e.g. Blanchard (2009), Angeletos and La’O (2009), Lorenzoni (2011))
discusses this idea, which Lorenzoni (2009) explicitly formalized: non-fundamental purely
expectational shocks resemble demand shocks; when positive, they increase output and em-
ployment, and they push inflation up. Stabilizing inflation emerges then as a natural policy
recommendation (Lorenzoni (2009)).
Nonetheless, a quick look at the US data suggests that consumer sentiment and inflation
exhibited an, in fact, negative correlation (−0.53) over the period 1965:Q1 - 2010:Q1 (see
Figure 1), whereas, in the second half of the 90s, a period registered as one of exuberant
optimism, the US economy combined high cyclical employment with low inflation. In partic-
ular, in the period 1995:Q1 - 2001:Q4 , consumer sentiment and cyclical employment exhibited
a strong positive correlation (+0.77), whereas over the extended period 1990:Q1 - 2002:Q4
(see Figure 2), consumer sentiment exhibited a mildly positive correlation with cyclical em-
ployment (+0.44), maintaining a mildly negative one with inflation (−0.41). In the same
direction, Christiano et al. (2010) document and show within a New Keynesian framework
that positive shocks to expectations about future productivity drive the output gap up and
inflation down. Evidence casts doubt then on the idea that purely expectational shocks
resemble demand shocks.
In this paper, I reconsider the role of expectations in economic fluctuations and develop a
theory able to account for the data patterns discussed. I suggest, in particular, that whether
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purely expectational shocks resemble demand shocks, as conventionally thought, or supply
shocks, as the data discussed seems to suggest, depends on the monetary policy pursued.
Therefore, any analysis of purely expectational shocks should be performed in light of the
monetary policy pursued.
I argue this within an economy which exhibits three key characteristics: it is compet-
itive, cashless, monetary, and features two representative agents, a consumer/worker and
a producer, with asymmetric information about the consumer/worker’s current productiv-
ity. In particular, the consumer/worker’s current productivity is known only to the con-
sumer/worker, whereas both agents observe a noisy public signal about the consumer/worker’s
long-run productivity. The producer’s incomplete information is the model’s only source of
inefficiency.
I let labor decisions be made before the monetary authority steps in and before the
commodity market opens, which requires both the consumer and the producer to form ex-
pectations about the monetary authority’s actions as well as about inflation. Yet, asymmetric
information leads agents to form heterogeneous expectations about the monetary authority’s
actions, which is exactly what opens the door to monetary policy, a feature my paper shares
with, among others, Weiss (1980), King (1982) and Lorenzoni (2010). Further, to the extent
that inflation partly reflects consumer long-run expectations, which operate through the Eu-
ler equation, the producer needs to second-guess the consumer. Consumer expectations thus
have real effects too and they do so in this indirect way.
Agents’ expectations, however, have different implications for the economy. To see this,
consider a positive shock to the noise component of the public signal, which increases both
agents’ expectations. Consumer expectations about long-run productivity push toward a
demand-shock interpretation of purely expectational shocks. A consumption-smoothing mo-
tive—expressed through the Euler equation—underlies their effects: a consumer overly opti-
mistic about the long-run prospects of the economy raises his current demand, which pushes
prices up. Under incomplete information, the producer overestimates the inflationary pres-
sure to be caused due to the consumer’s expectations. As a result, the nominal wage increases
more than proportionally relative to prices and a higher real wage prevails, which induces the
worker to increase his labor supply and production to expand. On the other hand, producer
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expectations about current productivity cause shifts in labor demand and push toward a
supply-shock interpretation of purely expectational shocks. In particular, a higher real wage
reflects the producer’s overly optimistic expectations. As a result, employment increases,
production expands and, at a certain demand level, prices need to fall for the commodity
market to clear.
Whether purely expectational shocks actually resemble demand or supply shocks depends
on the monetary policy pursued, and this is precisely the message that my paper bears. To
illustrate the role of monetary policy, let a monetary authority set the nominal interest
rate based on a standard Taylor rule, targeting current inflation and the current output
gap, and fix the nominal interest rate at a certain level. The weight on the output gap
proves, in particular, crucial as to how purely expectational shocks manifest themselves.
A positive purely expectational shock raises both agents expectations leading to a positive
output gap. The more the monetary authority responds to the output gap, the more the
producer overestimates the inflationary pressure to be caused once the commodity market
opens. Thus, supply expands by even more and the output gap becomes even greater. Then,
for the interest rate to remain constant, the inflationary pressure becomes lower, and it can,
in fact, turn to a deflationary one for a sufficiently strong response to the output gap. In
that case, purely expectational shocks manifest themselves as supply shocks.
The closest paper to mine is Lorenzoni (2009). Lorenzoni (2009) asks whether purely ex-
pectational shocks can behave like demand shocks and answers that, indeed, they can do. To
show this, he restricts attention to the consumer side within a New Keynesian environment.
My paper, instead, considers both the producer and the consumer side within a competitive
flexible-price environment. Rather more broadly, it asks how purely expectational shocks
behave, and argues that the answer depends on how monetary policy is pursued. To the best
of my knowledge, my paper is the first to suggest so. Hence, purely expectational shocks
can indeed resemble demand shocks, as Lorenzoni (2009) suggests, when the monetary policy
weight on the output gap is low enough, but they can instead resemble supply shocks, when
the weight on the output gap is high enough. In the latter case, they push employment and
inflation in opposite directions, which is incompatible with the Phillips curve.
Nimark (2013) estimates a model similar to Lorenzoni (2009)—although with a different
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type of signal and a richer shock structure—and obtains impulse responses to purely expec-
tational shocks which lend full support to the ones proposed here. Further, a supply-shock
behavior can reconcile purely expectational shocks with the empirical finding of Barsky and
Sims (2012), namely that shocks to expectations about future productivity (which can, in
principle, be fundamental or non-fundamental) raise output and substantially lower inflation.
Purely expectational shocks within the estimated New Keynesian DSGE model of Barsky
and Sims (2012) fail to cause a drop in inflation, which is partly why the authors essen-
tially dismiss them as unable to account for the estimated dynamics of aggregate variables.
Blanchard et al. (2012), on the contrary, favor a demand-shock interpretation of purely ex-
pectational shocks, based on an estimated model similar to that of Smets and Wouters (2003)
and Christiano et al. (2005). Perhaps crucially though, the authors’ prior for the weight on
the output gap is quite low (0.02), whereas the authors themselves admit that “to identify the
role of news and noise in fluctuations one must rely more heavily on the model’s structure”
(Blanchard et al., 2012, p. 26).
Turning to policy considerations, since the producer’s incomplete information is the
only source of inefficiency, a monetary authority should, therefore, restore the complete-
information equilibrium allocation. To do so it needs to manipulate inflation in such a way
that the producer correctly anticipates his revenue. By stabilizing prices it fails to do so
because it eliminates the producer’s uncertainty only about the prices he will sell at, while it
does nothing to ameliorate the producer’s uncertainty about the quantity to be sold. Output-
gap stabilization, on the contrary, restores optimality: anticipating the monetary authority to
respond aggressively to potential deviations of output from its efficient level is what renders
producer expectations irrelevant.
That a monetary authority can affect agents’ responses to information with its prospective
response to variables about which agents are currently asymmetrically informed is a central
feature also in Lorenzoni (2010). This feature distinguishes my paper from Weiss (1980) and
King (1982), in which monetary policy affects the informational content of prices. Angeletos
and La’O (2012) is a recent contribution studying optimal monetary policy under incomplete
information. Even though it does so within a quite different environment, it shares a key
policy implication with my paper: inflation stabilization is suboptimal. This is because,
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in both papers, incomplete information acts as a real distortion, eventually breaking the
so-called “divine coincidence,” an insight also offered by Blanchard and Gali (2007).
Broader relation to the literature. That shifts in expectations play a major role in
business cycle fluctuations is an idea with origins at least in Pigou (1926) . This idea has
recently been revived by the “news shocks” literature, which includes articles by Beaudry
and Portier (2004, 2006, 2007) , Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) , Christiano et al. (2010) ,
and Barsky and Sims (2011) . However, the “news shocks” literature distinguishes between
shocks to current and anticipated shocks to future productivity, whereas, crucially, my paper
distinguishes between fundamental and non-fundamental shocks to expectations.
As such, my paper lies naturally in the literature following Phelps (1970) and Lucas
(1972), which formalized the idea that incomplete information can open the door to non-
neutralities of non-fundamental shocks. Like the recent literature, my paper lets information
give rise to aggregate shocks and it entirely abstracts from monetary policy shocks:1 the
very existence of incomplete information is independent of the monetary authority’s actions.
Nonetheless, as I have already noted, it is asymmetric as opposed to incomplete yet symmetric
information about the monetary authority’s future actions that breaks the policy irrelevance
proposed in Sargent and Wallace (1975, 1976), allowing monetary policy to assume center
stage. In a sense, monetary policy acts here as a lever and, depending on how it is pursued,
it scales up or down the effects of aggregate shocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
defines equilibrium and pins down the optimality conditions. Section 4, first, characterizes the
benchmark complete-information equilibrium and, subsequently, the incomplete-information
one. Second, it demonstrates the paper’s central result through two numerical examples,
1The early literature focused on monetary shocks. Related papers in the early literature include Pole-
marchakis and Weiss (1977), Weiss (1980), King (1982), Bulow and Polemarchakis (1983) and, especially,
Grossman and Weiss (1982). The recent literature has shifted its focus to aggregate information shocks and
is developing in different yet complementary directions. For instance, following Phelps (1983) , the works
by Woodford (2001), Morris and Shin (2002), Hellwig (2002), Angeletos and Pavan (2007, 2009), Nimark
(2008, 2011), Angeletos et al. (2013) and Angeletos and La’O (2009, 2013) emphasize (or formalize within
a business-cycle context in the case of Angeletos and La’O (2013)) the role of higher-order beliefs. Mankiw
and Reis (2002), Sims (2003), Adam (2007), Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009) and Paciello and Wiederholt
(2012) among other articles emphasize the role of information-processing constraints, which Coibion and
Gorodnichenko (2012) explore empirically. Excellent surveys of both the early and the more recent literature
are offered in Hellwig (2008), Mankiw and Reis (2010), Lorenzoni (2011) and Veldkamp (2011).
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with the discussion deferred to Section 5 . Section 6 evaluates different specifications of the
monetary policy parameters and characterizes the optimal ones. Section 7 concludes.
2 Environment
The economy exhibits three key characteristics: it is perfectly competitive, cashless, mone-
tary, and features two representative agents, a consumer/worker and a producer, with asym-
metric information about the consumer/worker’s productivity. The consumer/worker sup-
plies labor to a representative firm he owns. The firm is managed by the producer and pro-
duces a single non-storable commodity. The only relevant financial market is a short-term
nominal bond market with the nominal bond price set by a monetary authority according to
an interest-rate rule. Time is discrete with an infinite horizon and commences in period 0 .
Each period is divided into two stages: in stage 1 , only the labor market opens (and closes),
whereas the commodity market and the nominal bond market operate in stage 2 .
The consumer’s preferences are given by
Ec−1
∞∑
t=0
βt U(Ct, Nt) , (1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) parametrizes the consumer’s time preference, Ct denotes consumption in
period t , and Nt denotes employment in period t . Period utility, U , is given by
U(Ct, Nt) = logCt − 1
1 + ζ
N1+ζt , (2)
where ζ > 0 is the inverse constant marginal utility of wealth (“Frisch”) elasticity of labor
supply.
The consumer faces a sequence of budget constraints given by
PtCt + QtBt+1 = Bt + WtNt + Πt . (3)
Pt denotes the commodity price in period t , Bt+1 denotes holdings of nominal bonds pur-
chased in period t and maturing in period t + 1 , Qt denotes the nominal bond price, Wt
denotes the nominal wage, and Πt denotes the firm’s profits that accrue to the consumer.
The firm’s technology is
Yt = AtNt , (4)
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where Yt denotes the firm’s output and At denotes the worker’s productivity. The firm’s
profits are given by
Πt = Pt Yt − WtNt . (5)
In line with Taylor (1993, 1999), a monetary authority sets the nominal bond price ac-
cording to the following interest-rate rule:
Qt = β Π
−φpi
t
(
Yt
Y ∗t
)−φy
. (6)
Πt denotes inflation in period t , which is defined as Πt ≡ PtPt−1 ; Y ∗t denotes the natural level of
output, which is defined as output produced in the absence of any frictions. I will henceforth
call output gap the distance of output from its natural level, Yt / Y
∗
t . The monetary policy
parameters φpi and φy can take only non-negative values.
2.1 Shocks
The producer faces uncertainty about the worker’s productivity, At . Let at ≡ logAt and
note that, henceforth, lowercase variables will denote natural logarithms of the respective
uppercase variables. Following Lorenzoni (2009) , productivity consists of a permanent com-
ponent, xt , and a temporary component, ut , which relate to each other in the following
way:
at ≡ logAt = xt + ut . (7)
The worker knows his productivity, at , however its decomposition is unknown to him.
The permanent productivity component, xt , follows a random walk process
xt = xt−1 + t , (8)
where t is an i.i.d. shock and  ∼ N(0, σ2 ) . The temporary productivity component, ut , is
i.i.d. and u ∼ N(0, σ2u) .
All agents observe a noisy public signal about the permanent productivity component
st = xt + et , (9)
where et is i.i.d. and e ∼ N(0, σ2e) . Shock e is, and I will hereafter call it so, a purely
expectational shock. All three shocks ut , t , and et are mutually independent.
7
2.2 Timing, formation of expectations, and information
Activity in each period is spread over two stages: labor decisions are made in stage 1 , whereas
consumption/saving decisions are made in stage 2 . All payments materialize in stage 2 and
are perfectly enforceable.
Stage 1 is in turn divided into two sub-stages. In sub-stage 1 , the consumer/worker
realizes his productivity , at , both agents and the monetary authority observe the noisy
public signal, st , about the permanent productivity component, xt , and the nominal wage
prevails. In sub-stage 2 , the worker decides on his labor supply and production takes place.
This intra-stage distinction is made possible by the firm’s linear technology (4): constant
returns to scale imply that the nominal wage in sub-stage 1 of stage 1 is unconditional on
the amount of labor to be submitted in sub-stage 2 .2
In stage 2 , the monetary authority steps in to set the nominal interest rate according to
the interest-rate rule given by (6) and the commodity market opens. The consumer decides on
his bond holdings and consumption at the prevailing prices. With nominal bonds in zero net
supply, the nominal bond price adjusts to clear the nominal bond market; with production
pre-determined from stage 1 , the commodity price adjusts to clear the commodity market.
I will show below that output or employment, given market clearing, or the commodity
price, perfectly reveal productivity at , which implies that in stage 2 of each period both
agents and the monetary authority have identical information. Permanent productivity, xt ,
however, will remain unknown to everyone.
Agents need, then, to form expectations about permanent productivity. In doing so, I
assume that they use the Kalman filter algorithm, which requires the use of past realizations
of the observables, i.e. productivity, a , and the public signal, s , and therefore implies that
the state of the economy coincides with the history of observables. In particular, expectations
2I have introduced a lag in the labor supply decision in order to prevent it from fully revealing the worker’s
productivity. Were technology instead to exhibit decreasing returns to scale, such a possibility would not be
available. An alternative in that case could be to let labor supply be subject to additional, idiosyncratic to the
worker, shocks (e.g. a preference shock). Labor supply would then (generically) be partially revealing about
the worker’s productivity. In the limit case in which the shock’s variance tended to infinity, the producer
would dismiss the informational content of labor supply and his information set would coincide with the one
here.
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evolve as follows:
Ept,1 [at] = E
p
t,1 [xt] = (1− µ)Ept−1,2 [xt−1] + µ st (10)
Ept,2 [xt] = E
c
t [xt] = (1− k)Ect−1 [xt−1] + k [θ st + (1− θ) at] , (11)
where µ , k , θ are coefficients, derived in Appendix A.1 , which depend on the shocks’
variances σ2u, σ
2
 , σ
2
e and lie in (0, 1) . Expectations are measurable with respect to the
agents’ information sets and, throughout, I use the shortcut Ejt [·] to refer to Et [· | Ijt ] , where
j = {p, c} . Superscript p refers to the producer and superscript c refers to the consumer.
Subscripts specify the period; in the producer’s case they additionally specify the stage, since
the producer’s information set differs across stages.
The first equality in (10) follows from (7) and the information specification. If, for in-
stance, st was a noisy signal about at instead of xt , the first equality in (10) would break
down. Let Ψt denote the state of the economy, which is given by Ψt = {(aτ )tτ=0 , (sτ )tτ=0} .
The second equality in (10) uses the fact that the producer’s information set in stage 1 , Ipt,1 ,
is given by Ipt,1 = Ψt\{at} , whereas the equalities in (11) use the fact that, in stage 2 , agents’
(and the monetary authority’s) information sets coincide with the state, i.e. Ipt,2 = I
c
t = Ψt .
3 Equilibrium
I define equilibrium as follows:
Definition 1 (Equilibrium). A rational expectations equilibrium under an interest-rate rule
Qt (Ψt) consists of prices {Pt (Ψt) , Wt (Ψt\{at}) , Qt (Ψt)}∞t=0 , an allocation for the producer
{Ndt (Ψt\{at}) , Yt (Ψt)}∞t=0 , and an allocation for the consumer {Ct (Ψt) , N st (Ψt) , Bt+1 (Ψt)}∞t=0
such that:
1. Allocations solve the agents’ problems, which are laid out below, at the stated prices.
2. Markets clear: Yt = Ct, N
d
t = N
s
t , Bt+1 = 0 for all t with B0 = 0 .
I will start with the consumer’s problem. The consumer has complete information about
the state and, therefore, effectively makes all decisions in stage 1 . Given B0 = 0 , the
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consumer chooses consumption, labor supply, and nominal bond holdings to maximize his
expected utility (1)-(2) , subject to his sequence of budget constraints (3) , and a no-Ponzi-
scheme constraint, which requires that Bt+1 > −Γ , for any Γ > 0 , at all t . The consumer’s
optimality conditions are
N ζt =
Wt
PtCt
(12)
Qt = β E
c
t
[
Pt
Pt+1
Ct
Ct+1
]
, (13)
with Qt set by the monetary authority according to (6) .
Equation (12) is the familiar intratemporal labor supply condition, which equates the
real wage with the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. Equation
(13) is the intertemporal Euler equation. Given the no-Ponzi-scheme constraint and the fact
that nominal bonds are in zero net supply, it requires, in equilibrium, prices and quantities
to be such that the demand (supply) for (of) nominal bond holdings is equal to zero at all
dates, that is Bt+1 = 0 for all t . Suppressing bond holdings from the state of the economy
is therefore harmless.
The producer chooses labor demand in sub-stage 1 of stage 1 to maximize the firm’s
expected evaluated profits, Ept,1 [λt Πt] , where profits, Πt , are given by (5) and are evaluated
using the consumer/owner’s Lagrange multiplier, λt = (PtCt)
−1 .3 Since, I will, henceforth,
always refer to the producer’s expectations as of stage 1 , I will switch to the simpler notation
Ept [·] . Given the linear technology (4), the solution to the producer’s problem requires the
producer to accommodate any labor supplied at a nominal wage such that the firm’s expected
evaluated profits are equal to zero. The nominal wage for which this is the case is given by
Wt =
Ept [λt PtAt]
Ept [λt]
, (14)
where the term Ept [λt PtAt] in the numerator denotes expected evaluated marginal revenue,
whereas Ept [λtWt] denotes expected evaluated marginal cost per unit of labor supplied.
3One may correctly point out that the consumer/worker’s Lagrange multiplier perfectly reveals produc-
tivity at . Implicitly I have assumed that, at the beginning of each period, the consumer and the producer
physically separate, which allows me to abstract from the “Lucas-Phelps” islands framework and consider
only one “island” in its stead. That said, by maximizing the firm’s evaluated profits, the producer operates
the firm in the way the consumer/owner would want him to (see also Chapter 6 in Magill and Quinzii (1996)) .
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Realized profits, however, are not typically equal to zero, which is absolutely central to
this paper. This is because the real wage is typically higher or lower than productivity,
yielding losses or profits, respectively, to the firm with losses (profits) subtracted (added) in
a lump-sum fashion from (to) the consumer/owner’s period wealth.
I will consider only linear rational expectations equilibria. Doing this simplifies consid-
erably the agents’ information extraction problems and enables me to use the Kalman filter
algorithm to study the evolution of agents’ expectations.
A first step is to express in log-linear form the solutions to the agents’ problems, (12) - (14):
ζnt = wt − pt − ct (15)
ct = − log β + logQt + Ect [ct+1 + pit+1] + const (16)
wt = E
p
t [at] + E
p
t [pt] + const
′ . (17)
Likewise, for the interest-rate rule (6):
it ≡ log 1
Qt
= − log β + φpi pit + φy (yt − y∗t ) . (18)
Substituting (17) in (15) and adding and subtracting pt−1 , and substituting (18) in (16)
yields the following two optimality conditions:
ζnt = E
p
t [at] + E
p
t [pit] − pit − ct + const′ (19)
Ect [ct+1] − ct = φpi pit + φy (yt − y∗t ) − Ect [pit+1] + const . (20)
Intratemporal condition (19) is the equilibrium labor market condition, whereas condition
(20) is the Euler equation, which I discussed above.
I will now proceed to the characterization of the equilibria.
4 Characterization of equilibria
I will first characterize and discuss the benchmark equilibrium in which the producer has
complete information (Section 4.1). Subsequently, I will turn to the incomplete information
11
one (Section 4.2).
4.1 Complete information benchmark
Suppose that the state of the economy is commonly known, i.e. suppose that Ipt = I
c
t =
Imt = Ψt . In this case, the public signal has no effect on output and employment and the real
side of the economy is determined independently of the monetary policy pursued. Effectively,
the division of a period into two stages ceases to matter.
In particular, under complete information, the real wage is equal to productivity, that
is, in logs, w∗t − p∗t = at , where z∗t denotes the complete-information equilibrium value of
variable zt . It follows then from (15) and market clearing together that
n∗t = 0 and y
∗
t = at . (21)
To pin down the nominal side, conjecture that pit = ϑ0 + ϑ1E
c
t [xt] + ϑ2 at . Using the
Euler equation (20), confirm then that
pi∗t = ϑ0 +
1
φpi
(Ect [xt] − at) , (22)
with the derivations for coefficients ϑ0 , ϑ1 , ϑ2 collected in Appendix A.2.1 .
We can confirm from (21) and (22) that the consumer’s expectations about permanent
(long-run) productivity, Ect [xt] , do have an effect on inflation; however they have no effect on
output and employment. To see why, note first that, due to a consumption-smoothing motive
expressed by the Euler equation (20), the consumer’s current demand depends positively on
the consumer’s expectations about permanent productivity, whereas it depends negatively
on the expected real interest rate, which I denote as rt . With prices being flexible, the
expected real interest rate responds one-for-one to shifts in the consumer’s expectations,
i.e. ∆ rt /∆E
c
t [xt] = 1 , preventing, thereby, the consumer’s expectations from having a
direct effect on output and employment. To see this point, note that, ignoring constants,
by eq. (22), expected inflation is equal to zero, i.e. Ect [pit+1] = 0 , which implies that the
expected real interest rate coincides with the nominal one, given by (18). That said, use (21)
and (22) to confirm that the nominal interest rate responds one-for-one to changes in the
consumer’s expectations. Of course, changes in current demand lead to according changes
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in current prices. In particular, the greater the consumer’s expectations about permanent
productivity are, the greater current demand is, and the greater the inflationary pressure
becomes. However, under complete information for the producer, the nominal wage adjusts
proportionally to the perfectly-foreseen stage-2 prices, leaving, thereby, the real wage intact
and preventing the consumer’s expectations from having an indirect effect on output and
employment through the producer’s expectations about prices.
Turning to monetary policy, it has no real effects due to both agents being able to perfectly
foresee the nominal interest rate to prevail in stage 2 . However, as I show below, what we
really need for monetary policy to be neutral is that agents have symmetric, although possibly
incomplete, information about the nominal interest rate to prevail.
4.2 Incomplete information
Suppose now that the producer does not know the consumer/worker’s productivity, that is
Ipt,1 = Ψt \{at} , whereas, the consumer, as in the benchmark equilibrium case, has complete
information about the state, that is Ict = Ψt . I show below that the monetary authority
also has complete information at the time it steps in, that is Imt,2 = Ψt .
I will assume that an equilibrium exists and will, subsequently, pin it down by guessing
and verifying. To this end, let me post the following conjectures about consumption and
inflation:
ct = ξ0 + ξ1E
p
t [at] + ξ2 at (C1)
pit = κ0 + κ1E
p
t [at] + κ2E
c
t [xt] + κ3 at . (C2)
Conjectures (C1) and (C2) imply that the producer and the monetary authority can fully
extract productivity, at , by observing production or employment, given market clearing, or
inflation, given (11), which indeed establishes that, in stage 2 , agents and the monetary
authority have complete information, i.e. Ipt,2 = I
c
t = I
m
t,2 = Ψt .
4
4Conjecturing instead that consumption and inflation depend on the entire history of public signals and
productivities would make no difference. This is a direct consequence of the way agents form expectations
(see the discussion in Section 2.2), which disciplines the treatment of public signals and productivities within
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Conjectures (C1) and (C2), optimality conditions (19) and (20), and market clearing
together imply that
yt = ξ0 + ξ1E
p
t [at] + (1− ξ1) at (23)
pit = κ0 +
1
φpi
[− (1 + φy) ξ1 Ept [at] + Ect [xt] + [(1 + φy) ξ1 − 1] at] (24)
ξ1 =
φpi − 1 + k (1− θ)
φpi (1 + ζ) − (1 + φy) , (25)
where k and θ are the endogenous learning coefficients derived in Appendix A.1 , whereas the
values of the constant terms, ξ0 and κ0 , as well as the derivations leading to eq. (23) - (25)
are collected in Appendix A.2 .
Equation (23) shows that output is a weighted average of productivity and the producer’s
expectations about it.5 The respective weights are parametrized by ξ1 , given by (25), and
depend on the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, parametrized by ζ, the learning coefficients
k , θ , and, importantly, the monetary policy parameters φpi , φy . I discuss the exact role of
all parameters and coefficients below.
The presence of the monetary policy parameters, φpi and φy , in (23) given (25) leads to
the following remark: monetary policy is non-neutral. To see why, express the labor market
optimality condition (19) in the following, more general, way:
ζnt = E
p
t [at] + E
p
t [pit] − Ect [pit] − Ect [ct] + const′ . (26)
To the extent that the monetary authority affects inflation with its actions, namely through
the setting of the nominal interest rate, monetary policy has real effects as long as agents form
heterogeneous expectations about the monetary authority’s prospective actions. Implicit in
this argument is that the monetary authority has more information at the time it steps in
than the least informed of the agents (here, the producer) has at the time the labor decision
the state. Further, modifying conjecture (C1) by allowing consumption to depend directly on the consumer’s
expectations would leave the results intact as the consumer’s expectations affect output only in an indirect
way, which I discuss below.
5That the respective weights sum to one is a consequence of preferences being logarithmic in consumption.
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is made. Effectively, the time advantage of the monetary authority is then an informational
advantage. Crucially, incomplete yet symmetric information about the prospective actions of
the monetary authority would render monetary policy neutral, which is an insight this paper
shares with, among others, Weiss (1980), King (1982), and Lorenzoni (2010).
To analyze equation (24), it helps to rearrange its terms in the following way:
pit = κ0 +
1
φpi
[(Ect [xt] − at) − (1 + φy) ξ1 (Ept [at] − at)] . (27)
Equation (27) shows that inflation depends positively on the wedge between the consumer’s
expectations about permanent productivity, Ect [xt] , and current productivity at , whereas,
as long as coefficient ξ1 , given by eq. (25), is positive, it depends negatively on the the wedge
between the producer’s expectations about current productivity, Ept [at] , and actual current
productivity at .
With different choices of the monetary policy parameters, φpi and φy , leading to different
combinations of signs of the coefficients in eq. (23) and (24) (equivalently, (23) and (27)),
the role of monetary policy emerges as a pivotal one. This suggests that the way shocks
affect the economy depends on the monetary policy pursued, a point central to my paper.
To illustrate it, I will proceed by comparing the effects of two commonly considered pairs of
monetary policy parameters.
4.2.1 Numerical examples
In both cases I consider, I let the monetary policy weight on inflation, φpi , be equal to 1.5 .
What distinguishes the two cases then, is the weight on the output gap, φy . In the first case,
to which Figures 3 and 5 correspond, I let φy = 0.5 , as suggested in Taylor (1993), whereas,
in the second case, to which Figures 4 and 6 correspond, I let φy = 0 , as in Lorenzoni (2009).
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the economy’s response to a positive one-standard-deviation
purely expectational shock, e , whereas Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the economy’s response to a
positive one-standard-deviation permanent productivity shock,  . The baseline parametriza-
tion appears in Table 1 and is the same as in Lorenzoni (2009) . This parametrization implies
that the Kalman gain terms, µ and k , are approximately equal to 0.22 and 0.23 respectively,
while the relative weight the consumer places on the public signal, θ , is approximately equal
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Table 1: Baseline parameters
Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply ζ 0.5
Standard deviation of temporary productivity shock σu 0.15
Standard deviation of permanent productivity shock σ 0.0077
Standard deviation of purely expectational shock σe 0.03
to 0.96 . In all the figures, periods, which appear on the horizontal axis, should be interpreted
as quarters.
I assume throughout this part as well as the rest of the analysis that, before any shock
hits, the economy is at its steady state. Since permanent productivity, x , evolves as a
random walk (see eq. (8)) , the steady state is stochastic and is pinned down by x . For ease
of exposition, I will suppress constants. Confirm then that at the steady state a = x and
Ep [a] = Ec [x] = x , which imply that y = c = x , n = 0 , pi = 0 , and r = i = 0 . With
no loss of generality, I further assume that x = 0 before any shocks hit.
What distinguishes Figure 3 from Figure 4 , and Figure 5 from Figure 6 , is the response of
inflation. In particular, following a positive purely expectational shock, both agents’ expecta-
tions about permanent productivity increase, and, as a result, so do output, employment and
the interest rates for both monetary policy parametrizations considered (see Figures 3 and
4). However, inflation falls in response to a positive purely expectational shock for φy = 0.5
(Figure 3) , whereas it rises for φy = 0 (Figure 4) . Given that output, employment, the
expected real interest rate and the nominal one respond in the same direction under both
monetary policy parametrizations, the response of inflation is crucial to the interpretation we
should attach to purely expectational shocks. In the case illustrated in Figure 3 (φy = 0.5),
purely expectational shocks resemble supply shocks, whereas in the case illustrated in Figure
4 (φy = 0) purely expectational shocks resemble demand shocks. The latter interpretation
is also given in Lorenzoni (2009) for the same choice of parameters. Observe, further, that
since agents learn over time, the economy eventually returns to its steady state.
Following a positive permanent productivity shock, both agents’ expectations increase yet
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they underreact. As a result, output behaves likewise, whereas employment and the interest
rates fall (see Figures 5 and 6). Once again, the response of inflation depends on the weight
put on the output gap. For φy = 0.5 , inflation rises in response to a positive permanent
productivity shock (Figure 5), whereas it falls for φy = 0 (Figure 6). Of course, as agents
learn, the economy moves toward its new steady state.
5 Monetary policy and expectations
In this section, I explain how different choices of monetary policy parameters lead shocks to
have different effects on the economy. I argue in three steps. First, I explain how agents’
expectations matter (Section 5.1). Next, I show that consumer and producer expectations
have different implications for the economy (Section 5.2). Last, I show how different choices
of monetary policy parameters determine which ones eventually prevail (Section 5.3). Addi-
tional remarks are collected in Section 5.4 .
5.1 How do agents’ expectations matter?
First, note that even though prices are flexible, the consumer’s expectations about permanent
productivity affect output and employment and, as I will now show, they do so in an indirect
way. To see this, note that the wedge in agents’ expectations about stage-2 inflation, which
affects the labor decision and appears on the RHS of eq. (26) , is equal to
Ept [pit] − Ect [pit] = Ept [pit] − pit = [κ2 k (1− θ) + κ3] (Ept [at] − at) , (28)
where the first equality uses the fact that Ect [pit] = pit , whereas the second uses conjecture
(C2) and the fact that
Ept [E
c
t [xt] ] = E
c
t [xt] + k (1− θ) (Ept [at] − at) . (29)
The presence in eq. (28) of coefficient κ2 , which measures the marginal effect of the con-
sumer’s expectations on inflation (see conjecture (C2) and eq. (24)), attests that the con-
sumer’s expectations affect employment, and hence output, indirectly via inflation. They
do so because the consumer has information about permanent productivity, xt , that the
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producer does not have. This extra information is current productivity at , which serves as
a signal to the consumer about permanent productivity, xt . To the extent that the pro-
ducer needs to guess inflation, as (26) shows, and to the extent that inflation depends on the
consumer’s expectations about permanent productivity, Ect [xt] , as conjecture (C2) implies
and eq. (24) shows, the producer needs to second-guess the consumer and the consumer’s
expectations matter in this indirect way.
The producer’s expectations about current productivity, at , matter to the extent that
the producer needs to guess the firm’s stage-2 revenue, which the firm’s profit maximization
problem requires him to. They matter in two ways, a direct one and an indirect one. The
direct way is due to the producer’s attempt to guess the quantity to be produced in stage 2,
which the first term on the RHS of eq. (26) captures. The indirect way is via inflation, and
is due to the producer’s attempt to guess stage-2 prices, which the second term on the RHS
of eq. (26) captures.
However, what in fact affects the labor decision, and hence output, via the inflation
channel, is what lies in the wedge between the agents’ expectations about inflation, Ept [pit] −
Ect [pit] , which is given by eq. (28). On the contrary, anything lying in the intersection of
the agents’ information sets (for example, the producer’s expectations) or outside their union
(possibly, other non-fundamental shocks) has no effect on output and employment via the
inflation channel. The inflation channel is, in turn, controlled by the monetary authority,
which the presence of the monetary policy parameters in eq. (24) given (25) attests, and in
this way monetary policy comes to the forefront.
5.2 Consumer expectations versus producer expectations
Shocks affect both agents’ expectations. The agents’ expectations have, however, different
implications for the economy. To best illustrate these differences, I will first discuss the effects
of purely expectational shocks.
Starting with the consumer’s expectations, we can see from eq. (24) that the coefficient
attached to them, 1 / φpi , is positive, which implies that the consumer’s expectations are pos-
itively related to inflation. Further, indirectly through inflation, the consumer’s expectations
are positively related to the labor decision, and hence output, which we can see from eq. (26)
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given eq. (28), after letting κ2 = 1 / φpi .
What underlies the effects of the consumer’s expectations is a permanent income hy-
pothesis motive, expressed through the Euler equation (20). To see this, consider a positive
purely expectational shock. Since a positive purely expectational shock leads the consumer
to overestimate the long-run prospects of the economy, consumption smoothing leads to an
upward shift in the consumer’s current demand, which in turn causes an inflationary pres-
sure, as eq. (24) demonstrates. With prices being flexible, in response to the upward demand
shift caused due to the increase in the consumer’s expectations, the expected real interest
rate, which as I show below coincides with the nominal one, increases one-for-one, just as it
would do under complete information (see Section 4.1), that is ∆ rt /∆E
c
t [xt] = 1 . This
equiproportional response of the expected real interest rate is what prevents the consumer’s
expectations from having a direct effect on output and employment.
However, as I argued in Section 5.1 , the consumer’s expectations matter indirectly
through the producer’s expectations about stage-2 inflation; the producer’s expectations
about stage-2 inflation, in turn, affect the nominal, and consequently the real, wage, causing
thereby shifts in supply.
More precisely, were the producer to have complete information, the nominal wage in
stage 1 would increase proportionally to the commodity price in stage 2 , and no effect on
output and employment would arise via the consumer channel (see Section 4.1). However,
when the producer has incomplete information, that is no longer the case. Since the public
signal coordinates agents’ expectations, the producer becomes overly optimistic too, that is
Ept [at] > at ,
6 and consequently overestimates the increase in the consumer’s long-run expec-
tations, that is Ept [E
c
t [xt] ] > E
c
t [xt] , which we can confirm from eq. (29). This is translated
into the producer overestimating the inflationary pressure to be caused in stage 2 by the
consumer’s expectations, which we can see from eq. (28) after controlling for κ3 and letting
κ2 = 1 / φpi . As a result, the nominal wage increases more than proportionally relative to the
commodity price. This, of course, means that the real wage increases, which causes employ-
6Since I assume that the economy is at its steady state before any shocks hit, what is more precisely true
for the producer’s expectations after a positive purely expectational shock hits is that Ept [at] = E
p
t [xt] >
at = xt . The first equality follows from (7), whereas the second one follows from the fact that purely
expectational shocks do not affect the economy’s steady state.
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ment to increase and production to expand, partly accommodating, thereby, the consumer’s
increased demand. However, by causing a shift in supply, the consumer’s expectations can
indirectly push inflation in a direction opposite to the —above-described—direct one, which
is an issue I deal with below. Controlling for that, we can conclude that purely expectational
shocks operating via the consumer’s expectations cause effects akin to those caused by de-
mand shocks, which Lorenzoni (2009) also demonstrates, although within a New Keynesian
framework.
Turning to the producer’s expectations, eq. (23) and (24) together show that they push
output and inflation in opposite directions, which suggests that the producer’s expectations
do indeed cause shifts in supply. A sufficient condition for the producer’s expectations to
be positively related to output, and hence negatively related to inflation, i.e. a sufficient
condition for the producer’s expectations to cause a downward shift in supply, is
Condition 1. φpi > max {φyζ , 1} .
Condition 1 requires monetary policy to be sufficiently responsive to inflation, with the
response to inflation, φpi , being weakly increasing in the response to the output gap, φy , and
weakly decreasing in the inverse Frisch labor elasticity, ζ .
Condition 1 leads the producer’s expectations to be positively related to current output
because it, effectively, requires the expected real interest rate to be negatively related to the
producer’s expectations. To see this point, note that
∆ rt /∆E
p
t [at] = ∆ it /∆E
p
t [at] = φpi κ1 + φy ξ1 = − ξ1 = −∆ yt /∆Ept [at] , (30)
where the first equality uses the fact that the expected real interest rate is equal to the
nominal one, the second equality uses (18), conjectures (C1) and (C2) and market clearing,
the third equality uses the relations among coefficients as they appear on the RHS of eq.
(24), and the fourth uses (23).
Eq. (30) shows that the producer’s expectations have precisely opposite effects on the
expected real interest rate and output, as argued. It is easy to see that coefficient ξ1 , which is
given by eq. (25) and shows up in eq. (30), is positive when Condition 1 holds. Hence, under
Condition 1, the producer’s expectations lower the expected real interest rate and increase
output.
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An additional benefit Condition 1 brings is that it rules out “sunspot” shocks, eliminating
thereby indeterminacies. The indeterminacies it eliminates are nominal: since “sunspot”
shocks lie outside both agents’ information sets at the time the labor decision is made, they
cannot have an effect on employment and output. I will assume throughout this section that
Condition 1 holds, with the remaining cases characterized in Appendix B .
To see why the producer’s expectations drive output and inflation in opposite directions,
note first that the inefficiency caused due to the producer’s incomplete information manifests
itself as a distortion in the labor optimality condition, causing, therefore, a shift in labor
demand. Under Condition 1, following a positive purely expectational shock, the—overly
optimistic—producer’s expectations shift labor demand positively. This results in a higher
equilibrium real wage, which induces the worker to increase his labor supply and production
to expand. For a certain commodity demand level, this causes a deflationary pressure since
prices need to fall for the commodity market to clear. Summing up, when purely expectational
shocks operate via the producer’s expectations, they cause effects akin to those caused by
supply shocks—interestingly, without affecting the economy’s natural level of output—and,
under Condition 1 , co-monotone ones.
5.3 Demand or supply shocks? The role of monetary policy
Will a demand- or a supply-shock interpretation eventually prevail for purely expectational
shocks? With both agents’ expectations pushing employment and output in the same direc-
tion (under Condition 1), the answer to this question depends on whose effect on inflation
dominates, which, as I will now show, depends on how monetary policy is pursued.
To best illustrate the role of monetary policy, let me consider the limit case where
σ2u / σ
2
e → ∞ , which implies for the learning coefficients that θ → 1 and κ → µ . There
are two advantages of considering this limit case. First, it lets purely expectational shocks
affect both agents’ expectations in exactly the same way at all horizons, which will free the
analysis from considerations related to the agents’ learning problems. Second, it disentan-
gles the producer from the consumer channel. To see this, recall from the previous section
that the consumer’s expectations, indirectly through inflation, accentuate the co-monotone
supply-shock manifestation of purely expectational shocks. By effectively letting θ → 1 , I
21
disregard aggregate productivity, at , in its capacity to serve as an additional signal to the
consumer about permanent productivity, xt . In this way, not only do I mute the indirect
effect via inflation of the consumer’s expectations on output, which we can see from eq. (26)
and (28) together, but I also mute the indirect effect back to inflation caused by the shift in
supply that the consumer’s expectations invite. To see this last point, note that coefficient
κ1 , which by conjecture (C2) measures the marginal effect of the producer’s expectations
on inflation, indirectly depends on coefficient κ2 , which by conjecture (C2) measures the
marginal effect of the consumer’s expectations on inflation, which we can confirm from (24)
and (25) together. Importantly, however, the direct effect of the consumer’s expectations on
inflation remains intact. The parametrization in Table 1 implies that the variance of the tem-
porary productivity shock, ut , is sufficiently small relative to that of the purely expectational
shock, et , for the approximation I consider here to be a good one. Appendix B characterizes
all cases and the intuition below applies to them too.
Further, let me point out the following relations for the inflation coefficients, which follow
from eq. (24) and (25):
κ1 + κ2 + κ3 = 0 (31)
κ1 + κ3 = − 1
φpi
, (32)
where, once again, by conjecture (C2) coefficient κ1 measures the marginal effect of the
producer’s expectations on inflation, κ2 measures the marginal effect of the consumer’s ex-
pectations on inflation, and κ3 measures that of productivity.
Since purely expectational shocks affect agents’ expectations in the same way, positive
purely expectational shocks lower inflation as long as the combined marginal effect on inflation
of the agents’ expectations is negative, that is when κ1 + κ2 < 0 , which at the same time is
a sufficient condition for output to increase. To see this last point, note that, since κ2 , which
is equal to 1 / φpi , is positive, κ1 + κ2 is negative only if κ1 is negative. We can see from (23)
and (24) that a negative κ1 implies (and is implied by) a positive ξ1 , where coefficient ξ1, as
we can see from (23), measures the marginal effect of the producer’s expectations on output.
Since, when κ3 > 0 , by eq. (32) we have that κ1 < − 1φpi = −κ2 and vice versa,
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requiring κ3 > 0 is equivalent to requiring κ1 + κ2 < 0 . What we need then for purely
expectational shocks to resemble supply shocks is that the marginal effect of productivity on
inflation is positive.
Confirm from (24) and (25) that for σ2u / σ
2
e → ∞ , coefficient κ3 tends to
κ3 =
φy − ζ
φpi (1 + ζ) − (1 + φy) . (33)
Under Condition 1 , the limit value of κ3 , κ3 , given by (33), which I will henceforth only
refer to, is positive if and only if φy > ζ . That is, a value of the monetary policy weight
on the output gap, φy , greater than the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply, ζ , implies
that purely expectational shocks are negatively related to inflation, causing, therefore, effects
akin to those caused by supply shocks.7 Further and always under Condition 1 , κ3 increases,
and, therefore, a supply-shock manifestation of purely expectational shocks becomes more
likely, as the weight on the output gap, φy , increases and the inverse Frisch labor elasticity,
ζ , decreases, which I will discuss in turn.
That a greater weight on the output gap, φy , renders a supply-shock manifestation of
purely expectational shocks more likely is a point central to this paper. To see it, note first
that by conjecture (C2) and after suppressing constants,
Ect [pit+1] = (κ1 + κ2 + κ3)E
c
t [xt] . (34)
Combining (34) with (31) implies then that expected inflation in the following period is
always equal to zero. In turn, this implies that the expected real interest rate coincides with
the nominal one, which is given by (18). Effectively, the monetary authority thus sets the
equilibrium expected real interest rate. Suppressing constants and using (18) as well as the
fact that y∗t = at (see Section 4.1) imply that the expected real interest rate is equal to
rt = φpi pit + φy (yt − at) . (35)
By the Euler equation (20) and market clearing, the expected real interest rate is such
that
rt = E
c
t [yt+1] − yt = Ect [xt] − [ξ1Ept [at] + (1 − ξ1) at] , (36)
7Away from the limit σ2u / σ
2
e → ∞ , κ3 > 0 requires the weight on the output gap, φy , to exceed a
threshold value lower than the inverse Frisch labor elasticity, ζ , which explains why we get a negative inflation
response in the numerical examples in Section 4.2.1 even though φy = ζ (see also Table 1). Appendix B
characterizes all cases away from the limit σ2u / σ
2
e → ∞ .
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where in the second equality I use the fact that Ect [yt+1] = E
c
t [xt] .
For σ2u / σ
2
e → ∞ , Condition 1 implies that the expected real interest rate increases in
response to purely expectational shocks. To see this, note that the response of the expected
real interest rate to purely expectational shocks is given by
∆ rt /∆ et = [φpi (κ1 + κ2) + φy ξ1] k = (1 − ξ1) k , (37)
where the first equality uses (35), conjectures (C1) and (C2), and the learning equations (10)
and (11), taking into account the facts that when σ2u / σ
2
e → ∞ , µ → k and θ → 1 ; the
second equality uses the relations among coefficients as they appear in (23) and (24). It is
now easy to confirm that, for σ2u / σ
2
e → ∞ and under Condition 1 , coefficient ξ1 is less than
one as claimed.
Next, confirm from (25) that the greater φy is, the greater is coefficient ξ1 , which mea-
sures the marginal effect of the producer’s expectations on output. This implies that, under
Condition 1 , as the weight on the output gap increases, the response of output, and hence
of the output gap, to a positive purely expectational shock becomes larger, i.e. the second
term on the RHS of (35) increases, whereas that of the expected real interest becomes more
muted, i.e. the LHS of (35) increases by less. It has to be then that as long as the weight on
inflation satisfies Condition 1 the inflationary pressure caused by purely expectational shocks
falls in φy .
To analyze this—paradoxical, at first glance—general-equilibrium result, note that under
Condition 1 , κ3, which measures the marginal effect of productivity at on inflation, increases
in the weight on the output gap, φy . Following the analysis in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, this
implies that the producer’s labor demand shifts up by more in the producer’s expectations
about stage-2 inflation. A greater upward shift in labor demand drives, in turn, output up
by even more and, for the commodity market to clear, the fall in prices needs to be even
more pronounced. In other words, under Condition 1 , as the weight on the output gap, φy,
increases, the supply effect becomes stronger.
At the same time, the (demand) effect of the consumer’s expectations is invariant to
changes in φy . This is because, under the premise that Condition 1 is satisfied, the marginal
effect of the consumer’s expectations on inflation, which is equal to 1 / φpi , is invariant to
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changes in φy . As a result, even away from the limit σ
2
u / σ
2
e → ∞ , changes in φy leave
the indirect effect of the consumer’s expectations on employment and output via inflation
intact too. With the demand effect of the consumer’s expectations intact, we therefore reach
the conclusion that, under Condition 1 , as the weight on the output gap, φy, increases, a
supply-shock manifestation of purely expectational shocks becomes more likely.
Turning to the Frisch labor elasticity, as it increases, that is as ζ falls, coefficient κ3
increases, which we can also confirm from (33). As a result, the labor demand effect I
discussed above becomes reinforced. At the same time, a lower ζ, i.e. a greater Frisch
labor elasticity, implies a more responsive labor supply to changes in the real wage, and thus
indirectly to shocks to the producer’s expectations. Both effects lead then to an increase in
coefficient ξ1 , which we can confirm from (25), and a line of thought similar to that above
applies.
5.4 Productivity shocks and further remarks
To best illustrate the effects of productivity shocks on inflation, consider a positive shock to
the permanent productivity component xt , t . Following a positive permanent productivity
shock, both agents’ expectations underreact, since agents attribute part of the increase in
the public signal to an increase in its noise component. As a result, both demand and supply
underreact resulting in a negative output gap and a fall in employment (under Condition
1). This result is in line with the findings of Gali (1999) and Basu et al. (2006) and is
also obtained in the more closely related works of Lorenzoni (2009) and Angeletos and La’O
(2009). The response of inflation, as before, depends on whether the demand effect of the
consumer’s expectations or the supply effect of the producer’s expectations dominates, which
in turn depends on the chosen monetary policy parameters: under Condition 1 , for φy > ζ
inflation rises in response to positive permanent productivity shocks, whereas inflation falls
for φy < ζ . The intuition is the same as in the case of positive purely expectational shocks,
saving, of course, for the fact that agents’ expectations underreact after a positive perma-
nent productivity shock. A minor difference, however, arises from the fact that productivity
shocks affect output, employment and inflation both directly and indirectly through agents’
expectations. Appendix B illustrates this difference, and further makes it clear that per-
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manent productivity shocks and purely expectational shocks of the same sign cannot push
inflation in the same direction.
Temporary productivity shocks on impact have effects similar to those caused by perma-
nent productivity shocks. However, from the following period onwards, they serve as purely
expectational shocks. Their effects are a mix, then, of those caused by the other two shocks.
Hence I will not discuss them separately.
By now, one might wonder what the role of the monetary policy weight on inflation,
φpi , is. In fact, general equilibrium effects complicate matters considerably as all three
coefficients associated with inflation, κ1 , κ2 , and κ3 , depend on the monetary policy weight
on inflation, φpi . This implies that not only the supply effect of the producer’s expectations
is affected, but also the demand effect of the consumer’s expectations. As a result, it is
hard to apply a reasoning along the previous lines and I have, therefore, opted to abstract
from such considerations. Instead, I only require the monetary policy response to inflation
to be sufficiently high in the way Condition 1 prescribes. I further evaluate the role of the
monetary policy parameters in the following section.
Let me conclude this section with two more remarks. First, as expected, when the
producer’s expectations are correct, that is when Ept [at] = at , the benchmark complete
information-equilibrium allocation prevails, scaled up, however, by the constant term eξ0 .
Second, we can see from eq. (25) that setting φpi = 1 − k (1 − θ) implies that ξ1 = 0 , i.e.
it renders the producer’s expectations irrelevant for output, which we can see from eq. (23),
and, using eq. (4), employment. The same is true in the limit case in which φy → ∞ . As I
show in the next section, optimal policies assign no role to the producer’s expectations, i.e.
they imply that ξ1 = 0 . The results throughout this section have been the outcome, then,
of policies which might be commonly considered, yet they remain suboptimal. One could
think of this as the downside of my model, which for expositional reasons has allowed only
for one source of inefficiency, namely the producer’s incomplete information. In a model with
more than one source of inefficiency, for instance along the lines of Lorenzoni (2010) or An-
geletos and La’O (2012), purely expectational shocks would survive in constrained-efficient
allocations.
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6 Welfare
This section discusses welfare and evaluates different specifications of the monetary policy
parameters.
Similar to Lorenzoni (2010) , the consumer’s expected lifetime utility can be expressed as
Ec−1
∞∑
t=0
βt [logCt − 1
1 + ζ
N1+ζt ] =
1
1− β W (ξ1) + t.i.p. , (38)
where ξ1 measures the marginal effect of the producer’s expectations on output and is given
by eq. (25). All derivations are collected in Appendix A.3 , where I further show that the term
W (ξ1) on the RHS of (38), and, hence, welfare, is maximized when ξ1 = 0 , that is when
the producer’s expectations have no effect on output and employment and the complete-
information equilibrium allocation is restored. This result should perhaps be unsurprising
since the producer’s incomplete information is the only source of inefficiency.8
Interestingly, in the limit case in which monetary policy responds infinitely aggressively to
inflation, that is when φpi → ∞ , we get from (25) that ξ1 6= 0 , that is producer expectations
keep having an effect on output and employment. This proves inflation stabilization sub-
optimal, a result at odds with Lorenzoni (2009) and, in fact, any work drawing on the
workhorse New Keynesian model (for the latter, see Ch. 3 Gali (2008)). As in Angeletos
and La’O (2012) , incomplete information manifests itself as a real rigidity, which prevents
inflation stabilization from leading to output-gap stabilization—i.e. the “divine coincidence”
breaks down, an insight also offered in Blanchard and Gali (2007).
More intuitively, at the beginning of each period, the producer faces uncertainty about
his stage-2 revenue; by stabilizing inflation, a monetary authority can only eliminate the
producer’s uncertainty about the price he will sell at in stage 2 , while it does nothing to
ameliorate the producer’s uncertainty about the quantity to be produced. In other words,
inflation stabilization eliminates only the inflation channel of expectations, captured by the
8One could argue that the inefficiency here is due to agents’ asymmetric information. Were agents to
have incomplete yet symmetric information, optimality would be restored. This is true however only because
preferences are logarithmic in consumption. In more general environments, the producer’s incomplete infor-
mation would suffice. Nevertheless, as I have already argued, it is asymmetric, rather than incomplete yet
symmetric, information, together with the presence of a nominal bond market, that enables the monetary
authority to have real effects and, potentially, drive the economy to its optimal level. If there were a real
bond market in lieu of the nominal bond market, the inflation channel would be absent and replicating the
complete-information allocation would not be possible.
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second and third terms on the RHS of (19) together (see also (28)), whereas it is entirely
silent about the direct, quantity channel of expectations, captured by the first term on the
RHS of (19).
Optimal monetary policy manipulates inflation in such a way that the producer, despite
his uncertainty about productivity, correctly anticipates his stage-2 revenue. We can see from
(25) that this is achieved when the monetary authority sets a weight on inflation equal to
φpi = 1 − k (1− θ) and this is so for any value of the monetary policy weight on the output
gap, φy . Such a policy, however, is hardly realistic since it requires a monetary authority to be
fully aware of the agents’ learning problems, let alone that it leads to nominal indeterminacy.
Optimality is also restored in the limit case in which the monetary authority’s response to
the output gap tends to infinity, i.e. when φy → ∞ , with this being so for any value of φpi ;
anticipating the monetary authority to respond in an infinitely aggressive way to potential
deviations in output from its efficient level is what “arrests” the producer’s expectations,
preventing them from having an effect on output and employment. This result is also in
sharp contrast with the policy implications of the New Keynesian paradigm (see Ch. 4 in
Gali (2008)). In a sense, the conventional policy implications of the New Keynesian paradigm
are here overturned: inflation stabilization is suboptimal, whereas output-gap stabilization
is optimal.
Finally, let me discuss how changes in the policy parameters, φpi and φy , affect welfare,
restricting attention only to policies involving values of φpi greater than one. In particular, I
will compare the performance of different policies, pinned down by different sets of monetary
policy parameters (φpi ,φy) , with that of the optimal ones, with the comparison being in
consumption equivalence terms. In particular, similar to Lorenzoni (2010), I will look for the
value of ∆ which is such that
Ec−1
∞∑
t=0
βt [log (1 + ∆)Ct − 1
1 + ζ
N1+ζt ] = W
∗ . (39)
W ∗ denotes the maximized welfare value obtained for the two above-specified policies re-
sulting in ξ1 = 0 ; ∆ denotes the proportional increase in lifetime consumption required to
reach the maximum level of welfare, W ∗ , when a certain policy pinned down by some pair of
policy parameters (φpi ,φy) is followed. Further, for a given value of the inverse Frisch labor
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elasticity, ζ , a greater value of ∆ corresponds to a lower level of welfare, which I explicitly
show in Appendix A.3 .
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the welfare comparison in consumption equivalence terms.9
The broad picture that emerges from Figures 7 and 8 is that a monetary authority should be
either relatively mild in its response to inflation and the output gap or relatively aggressive.
More precisely, in Figure 7 I explore how the welfare coefficient ∆ responds to changes
in the monetary policy weight on inflation, φpi , for different, across panels, values of the
monetary policy weight on the output gap, φy . We can see that, for φy = 0 , as the weight
on inflation increases, ∆ increases, i.e. welfare falls, whereas the opposite is true for φy = 0.5 .
In the rest of the panels, the same non-monotonic pattern emerges: for relatively low and
relatively high values of φpi , ∆ is lower, i.e. welfare is higher, than it is for intermediate
values of φpi . However, in no case is optimality restored.
In Figure 8 , I explore how ∆ responds to changes in the monetary policy weight on the
output gap, φy , for different, across panels, values of the monetary policy weight on inflation,
φpi . All panels exhibit the same non-monotonic pattern: ∆ is relatively higher, hence, welfare
is relatively lower, for intermediate values of φy . Finally, we can confirm that as φy increases,
∆ tends to zero and welfare to its maximum value.10
9Let me make four comments about Figures 7 and 8 . First, in addition to the values of the non-policy
parameters which can be found in Table 1 , I set β = 0.99 . Second, the values of ∆ , which appear on the
vertical axis, are multiplied by 100 so that the consumption change corresponding to a welfare difference is
expressed in percentage points. Third, for expositional reasons I do not report values of ∆ greater than 5
percentage points; instead, I report 5 . I do so because around the discontinuity point ∆ takes very large
positive values tending to infinity. Fourth, the “step” for φpi in Figure 7 and φy in Figure 8 is 0.1 .
10To provide an algebraic account of Figure 7 , note that for φy < ζ − (1 + ζ) k (1− θ) welfare decreases
(∆ increases) in φpi , for φy ∈ [ζ − (1 + ζ) k (1 − θ) , ζ] welfare (weakly) increases (∆ weakly decreases) in
φpi , whereas for φy > ζ welfare increases (∆ decreases) when φpi >
1+φy
1+ζ and decreases (∆ increases) when
φpi <
1+φy
1+ζ .
Let me explain further. Maintaining that φpi > 1 , we can see from eq. (25) that ξ1 > 0 as long as
φpi > max{1 , 1+φy1+ζ } . Differentiating ξ1 with respect to φpi yields ζ−φy − (1+ζ) k (1−θ)[φpi (1+ζ)− (1+φy)]2 , which is negative as
long as φy > ζ − (1 + ζ) k (1 − θ) . My remarks in the main text follow after taking further into account
that d2W/dξ21 < 0 and
dW
dξ1
|ξ1 =0 = 0 , which Appendix A.3 shows. Last, note that both ξ1 and ϑ ξ1/ϑφpi
exhibit a discontinuity when φpi =
1+φy
1+ζ .
To provide an algebraic account of Figure 8 , note that, welfare decreases (∆ increases) in φy when φy <
(1+ζ)φpi − 1 and increases (∆ decreases) when φy > (1+ζ)φpi − 1 . Once again, maintaining that φpi > 1 ,
confirm that ϑ ξ1/ϑφy > 0 . This means that whether welfare increases or decreases in φy depends solely
on the sign of ξ1 ; hence the remarks in the main text. Once again, note that there is a discontinuity when
φy = (1 + ζ)φpi − 1 (equivalently, when φpi = 1+φy1+ζ ) .
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7 Conclusion
Traditionally, purely expectational shocks have been thought to resemble Keynesian demand
shocks: when positive, they increase output, employment and inflation. However, such a
manifestation seems at odds with the low inflation and the high cyclical employment observed
in the US in the second half of the 90s, a period of exuberant optimism. In light of this,
I have reconsidered the effects of purely expectational shocks and shown that, indeed, they
can resemble demand shocks, as conventionally thought, but they can also resemble supply
shocks, as seems to have been the case in the 90s. In the latter case, they increase output and
employment—and, unlike typical supply shocks, they do not affect their natural levels—yet
they lower inflation. Whether purely expectational shocks resemble demand or supply shocks
depends on the monetary policy pursued. And it is precisely this the message that this paper
bears.
Recovering purely expectational shocks from the data would in fact shed light on the
causes of their seemingly shifting nature. Of course, however, the literature on the identifica-
tion of purely expectational shocks remains far from settled (e.g. Beaudry and Portier (2006),
Blanchard et al. (2012) and Barsky and Sims (2011, 2012)). Further, studying the effects of
purely expectational shocks in an environment enriched with credit constraints is a rather
natural theoretical extension, not least for the interesting monetary policy implications it
could generate. But I shall leave both for future work.
A Omitted derivations
A.1 Kalman filter
Let me start with the consumer’s learning process, which is a standard one. Suppose that
the consumer’s prior for period t permanent productivity, xt , is
xt | Ict−1 ∼ N(xt|t−1 , σ2x,t−1) ,
where xt|t−1 ≡ E [xt | Ict−1] and σ2x,t−1 ≡ V ar [xt | Ict−1] .
Upon the arrival of new information, {st, at} , the consumer’s information set becomes
30
Ict = I
c
t−1 ∪ {st, at} . Given that all the shocks, which are specified in Section 2 , are serially
uncorrelated, mutually independent, and normally distributed, Bayes’ Law implies that the
consumer’s posterior distribution is
xt | Ict ∼ N
(
(1− kt)xt|t−1 + kt [θ st + (1− θ) at] ,
(
1
σ2x,t−1
+
1
σ2e
+
1
σ2u
)−1)
,
where kt ≡
1
σ2e
+ 1
σ2u
1
σ2x,t−1
+ 1
σ2e
+ 1
σ2u
and θ ≡
1
σ2e
1
σ2e
+ 1
σ2u
. Learning coefficient kt denotes the Kalman gain
term, which measures the total conditional precision of new information, {st, at} , relative to
the total conditional precision of the consumer’s information; coefficient θ , which appears in
eq. (11), measures the conditional precision of the signal st relative to that of the consumer’s
new information.
Letting σ2x,t ≡ V ar [xt+1 | Ict ] , the prior for period t+ 1 permanent productivity, xt+1 , is
xt+1 | Ict ∼ N
(
xt+1|t , σ2x,t
)
,
where xt+1|t = (1− kt)xt|t−1 + kt [θ st + (1− θ) at] and
σ2x,t =
(
1
σ2x,t−1
+
1
σ2e
+
1
σ2u
)−1
+ σ2 . (40)
Let σ2x denote the solution (a fixed point) to the Riccati equation (40) (simply set σ
2
x ≡
σ2x,t−1 = σ
2
x,t) . A solution does not exist in the limit case where σ
2
e → ∞ and σ2u → ∞ . I
therefore dismiss this case.
I assume that both agents’ prior in period 0 is x0 | −1 ∼ N(0 , σ2x) , which implies that
both agents’ learning problems (see below for the producer’s one) are at their steady state
when time commences. As a result, the Kalman gain term in eq. (11) is time-invariant and
given by
k ≡
1
σ2e
+ 1
σ2u
1
σ2x
+ 1
σ2e
+ 1
σ2u
.
Turning to the producer’s learning problem, recall from the main text analysis that, by the
end of each period, both agents have received the same new information, that is Ipt−1,2 = I
c
t−1 .
Given this and their (assumed) common prior in period 0 , agents always have the same prior
distribution over the following period’s permanent productivity, x , which is time-invariant
as long as σ2x solves the Riccati equation (40) .
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The consumer and the producer’s information sets differ, however, in stage 1 of each
period. In particular, the producer’s information set is Ipt,1 = I
p
t−1,2 ∪ {st} . Then,
xt | Ipt,1 ∼ N
(
(1− µt)xt|t−1 + µt st ,
(
1
σ2x,t−1
+
1
σ2e
)−1)
,
where µt ≡
1
σ2e
1
σ2x,t−1
+ 1
σ2e
. To the extent that σ2x is time-invariant, µt is also time-invariant and
given by µ ≡
1
σ2e
1
σ2x
+ 1
σ2e
, which is the learning coefficient in eq. (10) .
Along the same lines and using eq. (7) , we can characterize the evolution of the producer’s
distribution of aggregate productivity, a , over time:
at | Ipt−1,2 ∼ N
(
xt|t−1 , σ2x,t−1 + σ
2
u
)
(41)
at | Ipt,1 ∼ N
(
(1− µt)xt|t−1 + µt st ,
(
1
σ2x,t−1
+
1
σ2e
)−1
+ σ2u
)
(42)
at | Ipt,1 ∼ N
(
(1− µt)xt|t−1 + µt st , σ2x,t + σ2u
)
. (43)
Once again, as long as σ2x solves the Riccati equation (40) , the variance of the producer’s
(prior or posterior) distribution for a is also time-invariant. To see this, for instance, in the
case of the producer’s prior, simply compare (41) with (43).
A.2 Equilibria
A.2.1 Complete information
Under complete information, we have that Yt = At , which you can confirm from (12) and
(14) together. This implies that the Euler equation (13) combined with the nominal interest
rate (6) yields
Π−φpit = E
c
t
[
1
Πt+1
At
At+1
]
. (44)
Conjecture that pit = ϑ0 + ϑ1E
c
t [xt] + ϑ2 at , where lowercase variables denote the natural
logarithm of the respective uppercase ones.
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Given this conjecture, the LHS of (44) is equal to
e−φpi (ϑ0 +ϑ1 E
c
t [xt] +ϑ2 at) . (45)
Turning to the RHS of (44) , first confirm that
Ect [pit+1 + at+1] = ϑ0 + (ϑ1 + ϑ2 + 1)E
c
t [xt] (46)
V arct [pit+1 + at+1] = (ϑ1k + ϑ2 + 1)
2 σ2x + (ϑ1kθ)
2 σ2e + [ϑ1k(1− θ) + ϑ2 + 1]2 σ2u , (47)
where I let Ect [·] ≡ E [· | Ict ] and V arct [·] ≡ V ar [· | Ict ] . In eq. (46), I use the fact that
Ect [xt+1] = E
c
t [xt] , whereas in eq. (47) I use (7) and (9), as well as the fact that the shocks,
which are specified in Section 2 , are mutually independent.
Given that shocks are log-normally distributed, the RHS of (44) is then equal to
e− [ϑ0 + (ϑ1 +ϑ2 + 1)E
c
t [xt]] + at +
1
2
{(ϑ1 k+ϑ2 +1)2 σ2x + (ϑ1 k θ)2 σ2e + [ϑ1 k (1−θ) +ϑ2 + 1]2 σ2u} . (48)
Matching coefficients in (45) and (48) yields
−φpi ϑ1 = − (ϑ1 + ϑ2 + 1) (49)
−φpi ϑ2 = 1 (50)
−φpi ϑ0 = −ϑ0 + 1
2
{(ϑ1 k + ϑ2 + 1)2 σ2x + (ϑ1 k θ)2 σ2e + [ϑ1 k (1− θ) + ϑ2 + 1]2 σ2u } ,
(51)
where σ2x solves the Riccati equation (40).
Solving (49) - (51) yields ϑ1 =
1
φpi
, ϑ2 = − 1φpi , which appear in Section 4.1 , and
ϑ0 = − 1
2 (φpi − 1) {(ϑ1 k + ϑ2 + 1)
2 σ2x + (ϑ1 k θ)
2 σ2e + [ϑ1 k (1− θ) + ϑ2 + 1]2 σ2u} . (52)
A.2.2 Incomplete information
Let me start with the optimality conditions. Plug the producer’s labor demand condition,
(14) , into the consumer’s labor supply condition, (12) , replace for λt taking into account that
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λt =
1
Pt Ct
, multiply and divide the RHS of the generated expression by Pt−1 , and confirm
that
N ζt =
1
ΠtCt
Ept [
At
Ct
]
Ept [
1
Πt Ct
]
. (53)
Turning to the Euler equation, (13) , take into account that the monetary authority sets
the nominal bond price according to (6) , and confirm that
Π−φpit
(
Yt
Y ∗t
)−φy
= Ect
[
1
Πt+1
Ct
Ct+1
]
. (54)
Note that (53) and (54) correspond to eq. (19) and (20) respectively in the main text. It
follows, further, from Section 4.1 that Y ∗t = At , which I will use from now on.
Let me now post conjectures (C1) and (C2) for log-consumption and log-inflation:
ct = ξ0 + ξ1E
p
t [at] + ξ2 at (C1)
pit = κ0 + κ1E
p
t [at] + κ2E
c
t [xt] + κ3 at . (C2)
Given that all shocks are normally distributed, I will show that, conditional on the agents’
information sets, conjectures (C1) and (C2) imply that both Ct and Πt are log-normally
distributed.
Let me start with the labor optimality condition, (53) . Taking technology (in logs yt =
at + nt) into account, it can be expressed as follows:
eζ (yt− at) = e− (pit + ct)
Ept [e
at− ct ]
Ept [e
− (pit + ct)]
. (55)
Next, using market clearing and rearranging terms in (55) yields
e(1+ζ) ct− ζ at +pit =
Ept [e
at− ct ]
Ept [e
− (pit + ct)]
. (56)
Taking conjectures (C1) and (C2) into account, the LHS of (56) is equal to
e(1+ζ) ξ0 +κ0 + [(1+ζ) ξ1 +κ1]E
p
t [at] +κ2 E
c
t [xt] + [(1+ζ) ξ2− ζ+κ3] at . (57)
The RHS of (56) is equal to
Ept [e
− ξ0− ξ1 Ept [at] + (1− ξ2) at ]
Ept [e
−{κ0 + ξ0 + (κ1 + ξ1)Ept [at] +κ2 Ect [xt] + (κ3 + ξ2) at}]
. (58)
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Conditional on the producer’s information set, Ipt,1 = Ψt \ {at} , the exponent in the
numerator of (58) is normally distributed with mean − ξ0 + (1 − ξ1 − ξ2)Ept [at] and variance
(1 − ξ2)2 σ2p,a , where σ2p,a ≡ V ar [at | Ipt,1] =
(
1
σ2x
+ 1
σ2e
)−1
+ σ2u and σ
2
x solves the Riccati
equation (40) (see also the analysis in A.1) . Then, the numerator of (58) is equal to
e− ξ0 + (1− ξ1− ξ2)E
p
t [at] +
1
2
(1− ξ2)2 σ2p,a . (59)
Before turning to the denominator of (58) , note that it follows from (11), given the
producer’s information set, that
Ept [E
c
t [xt] ] = (1−k)Ect−1 [xt−1] + k [θ st + (1−θ)Ept [at]] = Ect [xt] + k (1−θ) (Ept [at]− at) .
(60)
Let me now turn to the exponent in the denominator of (58) . It is normally distributed
and, using (60) , its mean is equal to
Ept [− (pit + ct)] = −{κ0 + ξ0 + [κ1 + ξ1 +κ2 k (1−θ) +κ3 + ξ2]Ept [at] +κ2Ect [xt]−κ2 k (1−θ) at} .
(61)
To find its variance, V arpt [− (pit + ct)] , where V arpt [·] ≡ V ar [· | Ipt,1] , first bring pit + ct into
the following form:
pit + ct = κ0 + ξ0 + (κ1 + ξ1)E
p
t [at] + κ2 [(1−k)Ect−1[xt−1] + k θ st] + [κ2 k (1−θ) + κ3 + ξ2] at .
It then follows that
V arpt [− (pit + ct)] = [κ2 k (1− θ) + κ3 + ξ2]2 σ2p,a . (62)
Using (61) and (62) , the denominator on the RHS of (58) is then equal to
Ept [e
− (pit + ct)] = e−{κ0 + ξ0 + [κ1 + ξ1 +κ2 k (1−θ) +κ3 + ξ2]E
p
t [at] +κ2 E
c
t [xt]−κ2 k (1−θ) at}+ 12 [κ2 k (1−θ) +κ3 + ξ2]2 σ2p,a .
(63)
Therefore, the RHS of (58) is equal to (simply divide (59) by (63))
eκ0 +
1
2
{(1−ξ2)2− [κ2 k (1−θ) +κ3 + ξ2]2}σ2p,a + [1 +κ1 +κ2 k (1−θ) +κ3]Ept [at] +κ2 Ect [xt]−κ2 k (1−θ) at . (64)
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Matching coefficients in (57) and (64) yields
ξ0 =
1
2 (1 + ζ)
{(1− ξ2)2 − [κ2 k (1− θ) + κ3 + ξ2]2}σ2p,a (65)
ξ1 =
1 + κ2 k (1− θ) + κ3
1 + ζ
(66)
ξ2 =
ζ − κ2 k (1− θ) − κ3
1 + ζ
. (67)
Observe that
ξ1 + ξ2 = 1 , (68)
which is a direct consequence of preferences being logarithmic in consumption.
Turning to the Euler equation, (54) , it can be expressed as follows:
e− [φpi pit +φy (yt−at)] = ect Ect [e
− (ct+1 +pit+1)] . (69)
Let me start with the LHS of (69) . We can use market clearing and conjectures (C1) and
(C2) to express it as
e− [φpi pit +φy (yt− at)] = e−{φpi κ0 +φy ξ0 + (φpi κ1 +φy ξ1)E
p
t [at] +φpi κ2 E
c
t [xt] + [φpi κ3 +φy (ξ2− 1)] at} . (70)
Before continuing, note that
Ect [E
p
t+1 [at+1] ] = E
c
t [xt] , (71)
which in turn follows from (10) and (11) .
Turning to the RHS of (69) , ct+1 + pit+1 conditional on the consumer’s information set,
Ict = Ψt , is normally distributed with mean
Ect [ct+1 + pit+1] = ξ0 + κ0 + (ξ1 + ξ2 + κ1 + κ2 + κ3)E
c
t [xt] , (72)
where I have used conjectures (C1)-(C2) and eq. (71).
To find its variance, V arct+1 [ct+1 + pit+1] , where V ar
c
t [·] ≡ V ar [· | Ict ] , use (7) and (9) to
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express ct+1 + pit+1 as
ct+1 + pit+1 =
= ξ0 + κ0 + [(ξ1 + κ1)(1− µ) + κ2(1− k)]Ect [xt] + [(ξ1 + κ1)µ+ κ2kθ]st+1 + [ξ2 + κ2k(1− θ) + κ3]at+1
= G+ [(ξ1 + κ1)µ+ κ2k + ξ2 + κ3]xt+1 + [(ξ1 + κ1)µ+ κ2kθ]et+1 + [ξ2 + κ2k(1− θ) + κ3]ut+1,
where G ≡ ξ0 + κ0 + [(ξ1 +κ1) (1−µ) + κ2 (1−k)]Ect [xt] is a term known to the consumer
in period t .
Given that shocks are mutually independent, it follows that
V arct+1[ct+1 +pit+1] = [(ξ1 +κ1)µ+κ2k+ ξ2 +κ3]
2 σ2x + [(ξ1 +κ1)µ+κ2kθ]
2 σ2e + [ξ2 +κ2k(1−θ) +κ3]2 σ2u .
(73)
Hence, using (72) and (73) we get
Ect [e
− (ct+1 +pit+1)] =
= e− [ ξ0 +κ0 + (ξ1 + ξ2 +κ1 +κ2 +κ3)E
c
t [xt] ] +
1
2
{[(ξ1 +κ1)µ+κ2 k + ξ2 +κ3]2 σ2x + [(ξ1 +κ1)µ+κ2 k θ]2 σ2e + [ξ2 +κ2 k (1−θ) +κ3]2 σ2u} .
Consequently, the RHS of (69) becomes
ect Ect [e
− (ct+1 +pit+1)] = e−κ0+
1
2
{[(ξ1 +κ1)µ+κ2 k+ ξ2 +κ3]2 σ2x + [(ξ1 +κ1)µ+κ2 k θ]2 σ2e + [ξ2 +κ2 k (1−θ) +κ3]2 σ2u}×
× eξ1 Ept [at]− (ξ1 + ξ2 +κ1 +κ2 +κ3)Ect [xt] + ξ2 at . (74)
Matching coefficients in (70) and (74) yields
κ0 = −
φyξ0 +
1
2
{[(ξ1 + κ1)µ+ κ2k + ξ2 + κ3]2σ2x + [(ξ1 + κ1)µ+ κ2kθ]2 σ2e + [ξ2 + κ2k(1− θ) + κ3]2σ2u}
φpi − 1
(75)
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and
− (φpi κ1 + φy ξ1) = ξ1 (76)
−φpi κ2 = − (ξ1 + ξ2 + κ1 + κ2 + κ3) (77)
− [φpi κ3 + φy (ξ2 − 1)] = ξ2 , (78)
where ξ0 is given by (65) .
Coefficients ξ1 , ξ2 , κ1 , κ2 , κ3 solve eq. (67) - (68) and (76) - (78) returning the coefficients
in eq. (23) - (24) as well as eq. (25) in the main text.
Summing (76) - (78) across sides and using (68) yields
κ1 + κ2 + κ3 = 0 , (79)
whereas summing (76) and (78) across sides and again using (68) yields
κ1 + κ3 = − 1
φpi
, (80)
which are equations (31) and (32) respectively in the main text.
Finally, use (68), (76) - (78) and eq. (25) from the main text, and after some manipulation
confirm that ξ0 , which is given by (65), can be expressed in terms of ξ1 as follows
ξ0 =
(1− ζ)σ2p,a
2
ξ21 . (81)
A.3 Welfare
The expected lifetime utility of the consumer is given by
Ec−1
∞∑
t=0
βt [logCt − 1
1 + ζ
N1+ζt ] . (82)
Let me first take the expectation of period t utility conditional on the consumer’s in-
formation set in period t − 1 . Using conjecture (C1) and eq. (68), bearing in mind that
Ect−1 [xt] = E
c
t−1 [xt−1] , confirm that
E [logCt | Ict−1] = ξ0 + Ect−1 [xt−1] . (83)
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Turning to employment, first express it as
nt = ξ0 + ξ1 (E
p
t [at] − at) = ξ0 + ξ1 (1−µ)Ect−1 [xt−1] + ξ1 (µ−1)xt + ξ1 µ et − ξ1 ut , (84)
where, in the first equality, I use conjecture (C1) and eq. (68), whereas in the second equality I
use the producer’s learning process (10) as well as (7) and (9). Given that shocks are mutually
independent and normally distributed, the conditional distribution of employment is
nt | Ict−1 ∼
(
ξ0 , [ (µ− 1)2 σ2x + µ2 σ2e + σ2u ] ξ21
)
, (85)
where σ2x solves the Riccati equation (40) . The mean in (85) follows from (84), the producer’s
learning process (10), and the fact that Ect−1 [E
p
t [at]] = E
c
t−1 [at] = E
c
t−1 [xt−1] .
Using (83) and (85), it follows that
E [logCt − 1
1 + ζ
N1+ζt | Ict−1] = ξ0 + Ect−1 [xt−1] −
1
1 + ζ
e(1+ζ) ξ0 +
(1+ζ)2
2
[(µ−1)2 σ2x +µ2 σ2e +σ2u] ξ21 ,
(86)
where the second term on the RHS of (86) is independent of policy.
To find the unconditional expected utility, use (86) and confirm that
Ec−1
∞∑
t=0
βt [logCt− 1
1 + ζ
N1+ζt ] =
1
1− β
[
ξ0 − 1
1 + ζ
e(1+ζ) ξ0 +
(1+ζ)2
2
[(µ−1)2 σ2x +µ2 σ2e +σ2u] ξ21
]
+ t.i.p. .
(87)
Since ξ0 can be expressed in terms of ξ1 using eq. (81), the term in square brackets on the
RHS of (87) can also be expressed in terms of ξ1 . Let W (ξ1) which appears on the RHS of
eq. (38) in the main text denote it, and confirm that it is equal to
W (ξ1) =
(1− ζ)σ2p,a
2
ξ21 −
1
1 + ζ
e
(1−ζ2)σ2p,a
2
ξ21 +
(1+ζ)2
2
[(µ−1)2 σ2x +µ2 σ2e +σ2u] ξ21 . (88)
Eq. (88) can be simplified as
W (ξ1) =
(1− ζ)σ2p,a
2
ξ21 −
1
1 + ζ
e
1+ζ
2
[(1−ζ)σ2p,a + γ (1+ζ)] ξ21 , (89)
where γ ≡ (µ− 1)2 σ2x + µ2 σ2e + σ2u .
I will next show that welfare is maximized only when ξ1 = 0 . To this end, let me first
show that dW (ξ1)/dξ1 = 0 only when ξ1 = 0 . Differentiating W (ξ1) , as given by (89), with
respect to ξ1 yields
dW (ξ1)
dξ1
= ξ1 {(1− ζ)σ2p,a − e
1+ζ
2
[(1−ζ)σ2p,a + γ (1+ζ)] ξ21 [(1− ζ)σ2p,a + γ (1 + ζ)]} . (90)
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For dW (ξ1)
dξ1
= 0 , it either has to be that ξ1 = 0 or
ξ21 =
2
(1 + ζ) [(1− ζ)σ2p,a + γ (1 + ζ)]
log
[
(1− ζ)σ2p,a
(1− ζ)σ2p,a + γ (1 + ζ)
]
. (91)
The RHS of (91) is always a negative number and, since I restrict attention to real solutions,
we can conclude that the only one is ξ1 = 0 .
The second-order derivative of W (ξ1) with respect to ξ1 is equal to
d2W (ξ1)
dξ21
= (1−ζ)σ2p,a− e
1+ζ
2
[(1−ζ)σ2p,a + γ (1+ζ)] ξ21 [(1−ζ)σ2p,a + γ (1+ζ)]{1 + [(1−ζ)σ2p,a + γ (1+ζ)] (1+ζ) ξ21},
(92)
which is always negative.
It then follows that welfare is maximized only for ξ1 = 0 . Substituting for ξ1 = 0 in (89)
yields W (0) = − 1
1+ζ
. Substituting this in turn in eq. (38) implies that maximum welfare
is equal to
W ∗ = − 1
(1− β) (1 + ζ) + t.i.p. , (93)
which appears on the RHS of eq. (39).
Finally, substituting for W ∗ in eq. (39) implies that ∆ satisfies the following equation:
log (1 + ∆) = −
(
W (ξ1) +
1
1 + ζ
)
. (94)
Holding ζ constant, it follows that ∆ is negatively related to W (ξ1) and, therefore, welfare.
B Appendix to Section 4.2
This appendix characterizes the conditions which pin down the business cycle effects of purely
expectational and permanent productivity shocks. I ignore, throughout, the possibility of
nominal indeterminacies.
B.1 Purely expectational shocks
I will start with the conditions under which purely expectational shocks, e , behave like co-
monotone supply shocks—that is when positive, they increase output and employment and
they lower inflation.
40
Since purely expectational shocks do not affect productivity, at , and given that labor is
the only input used in the production of output (see eq. (4)), purely expectational shocks
push output and employment in the same direction.
Positive purely expectational shocks increase output and employment when
ξ1 > 0 , (A)
where ξ1 is given by (25) . Condition A follows from eq. (23).
Purely expectational shocks affect inflation through both agents’ expectations. They will
lower inflation on impact if and only if
(1 + φy) ξ1 µ − k θ > 0 , (95)
and, post-impact, if and only if
(1 + φy) ξ1 (1− µ) (1− k)s−1 k θ + (1− k)s k θ > 0 for s ≥ 1 , (96)
where s corresponds to period t+ s . Eq. (95) and (96) follow from eq. (24) and the agents’
learning problems, given by eq. (10) and (11).
One can confirm from Appendix A.1 that the agents’ learning problems imply that
1− k
1− µ =
k θ
µ
= 1 − k(1− θ). (97)
As a result, both (95) and (96) boil down to Condition B :
ξ1 >
1
1 + φy
1− k
1− µ . (B)
Since the term on the RHS of Condition B is positive, Condition B implies Condition A .
Condition B is then necessary and sufficient for purely expectational shocks to behave like
supply shocks. One can confirm that Condition B boils down to the following requirements:
φy >
1− k
1− µ (1 + ζ) − 1 and φpi >
1 + φy
1 + ζ
or
φy <
1− k
1− µ (1 + ζ) − 1 and φpi <
1 + φy
1 + ζ
.
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Along the same lines, purely expectational shocks cause effects associated with demand
shocks—that is when positive they increase output, employment, and inflation—when
ξ1 > 0 (A)
and
ξ1 <
1
1 + φy
1− k
1− µ , (C)
with ξ1 given by (25) . When Condition A holds, positive purely expectational shocks increase
output and employment, whereas when Condition C holds positive purely expectational
shocks increase inflation.
Condition A requires
φpi > max
{
1 + φy
1 + ζ
,
1− k
1− µ
}
or
φpi < min
{
1 + φy
1 + ζ
,
1− k
1− µ
}
,
where I have again used eq. (97).
Condition C requires
φy >
1− k
1− µ (1 + ζ) − 1 and φpi <
1 + φy
1 + ζ
or
φy <
1− k
1− µ (1 + ζ) − 1 and φpi >
1 + φy
1 + ζ
.
Conditions A and C together then boil down to
φy >
1− k
1− µ (1 + ζ) − 1 and φpi <
1− k
1− µ
or
φy <
1− k
1− µ (1 + ζ) − 1 and φpi >
1− k
1− µ .
Let φ∗y ≡ 1−k1−µ (1 + ζ) − 1 . The following proposition summarizes the above results:
42
Proposition 1. For φy > φ
∗
y , purely expectational shocks cause effects associated with
supply shocks when φpi >
1+φy
1+ζ
, whereas they cause effects associated with demand shocks
when φpi <
1−k
1−µ .
For φy < φ
∗
y , purely expectational shocks cause effects associated with supply shocks when
φpi <
1+φy
1+ζ
, whereas they cause effects associated with demand shocks when φpi >
1−k
1−µ .
Note that, since 1−k
1−µ < 1 , it might be that φ
∗
y < 0 . In that case, the non-negativity
constraint on φy binds, and the second part of Proposition 1 becomes irrelevant.
In the special case in which φy = φ
∗
y , it follows from (25) that ξ1 =
1
1+ζ
. Since this
implies that Condition A is met, positive purely expectational shocks increase output and
employment. However, since the agents’ effects on inflation precisely offset each other, purely
expectational shocks have no effect on inflation, which we can confirm by observing that both
conditions B and C are violated. In the special case in which φpi =
1−k
1−µ , it follows from
(25) that ξ1 = 0 . As a result, positive purely expectational shocks have no effect on output
and, since Condition C is satisfied, they are inflationary. The case in which φpi =
1+φy
1+ζ
is
undefined.
In the two remaining cases, in particular, when either φy > φ
∗
y and
1−k
1−µ < φpi <
1+φy
1+ζ
,
or when φy < φ
∗
y and
1+φy
1+ζ
< φpi <
1−k
1−µ , Condition C is met but Condition A is violated.
Then, positive purely expectational shocks lower output and employment and they raise
inflation.
A special case. Consider the case discussed in the main text, in which σ2u / σ
2
e → ∞ .
Since, we have, then, that θ → 1 and k → µ , the learning coefficients are eliminated from
Proposition 1 . This case, further, implies that φ∗y → ζ . Hence, Proposition 1 is modified as
follows:
Proposition 2 (special case). When σ2u / σ
2
e → ∞ ,
• for φy > ζ , purely expectational shocks cause effects associated with supply shocks when
φpi >
1+φy
1+ζ
, whereas they cause effects associated with demand shocks when φpi < 1 .
• for φy < ζ , purely expectational shocks cause effects associated with supply shocks when
φpi <
1+φy
1+ζ
, whereas they cause effects associated with demand shocks when φpi > 1 .
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For the cases not considered in Proposition 2 , check the analysis above.
B.2 Permanent productivity shocks
Suppose that a permanent productivity shock, t , hits the economy. Then the impulse
responses of output, employment, and inflation are given respectively by
dyt+s
dt
= 1 − (1− k)s (1 − µ) ξ1 (98)
dnt+s
dt
= ξ1
(
dEpt+s
dt
− dat+s
dt
)
= ξ1
(
dEpt+s
dt
− 1
)
(99)
dpit+s
dt
= (1− k)s [(1 + φy) ξ1 (1− µ) − (1− k)] , (100)
where s ≥ 0 and ξ1 is given by (25) . Eq. (98) and (100) follow, respectively, from (23)
and (24) and the agents’ learning problems, which are given by eq. (10) and (11). The first
equality in (99) uses (23) and technology, given by (4), whereas the second equality in (99)
uses the fact that productivity a responds one-for-one to changes in permanent productivity,
x .
It follows from eq. (98) - (100) that a positive permanent productivity shock raises output,
lowers employment, and raises inflation when
ξ1 <
1
1− µ (D)
ξ1 > 0 (A)
ξ1 >
1
1 + φy
1− k
1− µ . (B)
Condition D refers to output and follows from (98) and the fact that 1− µ is the maximum
value that the term on its RHS (1−k)s (1−µ) takes. Condition A refers to employment and
follows from (99) and the fact that
dEpt+s
dt
< 1 , whereas Condition B refers to inflation and
follows from (100). Recall that Condition B implies Condition A . Hence, conditions D and
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B together are necessary and sufficient for positive permanent productivity shocks to raise
output, lower employment, and raise inflation.
Condition D requires
φpi > max
{
1 + φy
1 + ζ
,
µ + φy + (1− µ) k (1− θ)
µ + ζ
}
or
φpi < min
{
1 + φy
1 + ζ
,
µ + φy + (1− µ) k (1− θ)
µ + ζ
}
.
As we have already seen, Condition B requires
φy >
1− k
1− µ (1 + ζ) − 1 and φpi >
1 + φy
1 + ζ
or
φy <
1− k
1− µ (1 + ζ) − 1 and φpi <
1 + φy
1 + ζ
.
Confirm that 1+φy
1+ζ
> µ+φy+ (1−µ) k (1−θ)
µ+ ζ
is true only if φy <
1−k
1−µ (1 + ζ) − 1 and the
same is true for the opposite inequalities as well as the equality. Then, conditions B and D
together require
φy >
1− k
1− µ (1 + ζ) − 1 and φpi >
µ + φy + (1− µ) k (1− θ)
µ + ζ
or
φy <
1− k
1− µ (1 + ζ) − 1 and φpi <
µ + φy + (1− µ) k (1− θ)
µ + ζ
.
Positive permanent productivity shocks raise output and they lower employment and
inflation when
ξ1 <
1
1− µ (D)
ξ1 > 0 (A)
ξ1 <
1
1 + φy
1− k
1− µ . (C)
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Observe that Condition C implies Condition D . Hence, conditions A and C together are
necessary and sufficient for positive permanent productivity shocks to raise output and lower
employment and inflation.
As we have already seen, Condition C requires
φy >
1− k
1− µ (1 + ζ) − 1 and φpi <
1 + φy
1 + ζ
or
φy <
1− k
1− µ (1 + ζ) − 1 and φpi >
1 + φy
1 + ζ
,
whereas Condition A requires
φpi > max
{
1 + φy
1 + ζ
,
1− k
1− µ
}
or
φpi < min
{
1 + φy
1 + ζ
,
1− k
1− µ
}
.
Conditions A and C then together require
φy >
1− k
1− µ (1 + ζ) − 1 and φpi <
1− k
1− µ
or
φy <
1− k
1− µ (1 + ζ) − 1 and φpi >
1− k
1− µ .
As above, let φ∗y =
1−k
1−µ (1 + ζ) − 1 . The following proposition summarizes the results
above:
Proposition 3. For φy > φ
∗
y , positive permanent productivity shocks raise output and
inflation and they lower employment when φpi >
µ+φy+ (1−µ) k (1−θ)
µ+ ζ
, whereas they raise output
and they lower inflation and employment when φpi <
1−k
1−µ .
For φy < φ
∗
y , positive permanent productivity shocks raise output and inflation and they
lower employment when φpi <
µ+φy+ (1−µ) k (1−θ)
µ+ ζ
, whereas they raise output and they lower
inflation and employment when φpi >
1−k
1−µ .
As we have already seen, in the special case in which φy = φ
∗
y , it follows from (25) that
ξ1 =
1
1+ζ
. This implies that conditions D and A are met, whereas both conditions B and
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C are violated. As a result, positive permanent productivity shocks increase output, lower
employment, and have no effect on inflation. In the special case in which φpi =
1−k
1−µ , it
follows from (25) that ξ1 = 0 . As a result, positive permanent productivity shocks have
no effect on employment and, since conditions D and C are satisfied, they raise output and
they lower inflation. The case in which φpi =
1+φy
1+ζ
is undefined. In the special case in which
φpi =
µ+φy+ (1−µ) k (1−θ)
µ+ ζ
, we get that ξ1 =
1
1−µ . This violates Condition D, but satisfies
conditions A and B . As a result, positive permanent productivity shocks have no impact
effect on output, however they increase output from the following period onwards, whereas
they lower employment and raise inflation.
There are four remaining cases. When either φy > φ
∗
y and
1+φy
1+ζ
< φpi <
µ+φy+ (1−µ) k (1−θ)
µ+ ζ
,
or φy < φ
∗
y and
µ+φy+ (1−µ) k (1−θ)
µ+ ζ
< φpi <
1+φy
1+ζ
, conditions A and B are satisfied, whereas
Condition D is violated. This implies that positive permanent productivity shocks lower
employment, raise inflation, and, at least on impact, they lower output.
When either φy > φ
∗
y and
1−k
1−µ < φpi <
1+φy
1+ζ
, or φy < φ
∗
y and
1+φy
1+ζ
< φpi <
1−k
1−µ ,
conditions D and C are satisfied, whereas Condition A is violated. Positive permanent
productivity shocks raise, then, output and employment and they lower inflation.
The special case revisited. Consider again the case discussed in the main text, in which
σ2u / σ
2
e → ∞ . This case eliminates the learning coefficients from Proposition 3 . It, further,
implies that φ∗y → ζ . Hence, Proposition 3 is modified as follows:
Proposition 4 (special case). When σ2u / σ
2
e → ∞ ,
• for φy > ζ , positive permanent productivity shocks raise output and inflation and they
lower employment when φpi >
µ+φy
µ+ζ
, whereas they raise output and they lower inflation
and employment when φpi < 1 .
• for φy < ζ , positive permanent productivity shocks raise output and inflation and they
lower employment when φpi <
µ+φy
µ+ζ
, whereas they raise output and they lower inflation
and employment when φpi > 1 .
For the cases not considered in Proposition 4 , check the analysis above.
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Figure 1: Percent Changes in GDP Deflator and Consumer Sentiment
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Notes: The data is collected from the St. Louis Fed, it is US quarterly and spans the period 1965:Q1-2010:Q1 .
Inflation (solid line) refers to percent changes in the “Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator”
(series GDPDEF) and is seasonally adjusted. Consumer Sentiment (dot-dashed line) refers to “University
of Michigan: Consumer Sentiment” (series UMCSENT1, UMCSENT) and is not seasonally adjusted. For
expositional clarity, I have scaled it down by 25 .
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Figure 2: Percent Changes in GDP Deflator, Cyclical Employment and Consumer Sentiment
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Notes: The data is collected from the St. Louis Fed, it is US quarterly and spans the period 1990:Q1-2002:Q4 .
Inflation (solid line) refers to percent changes in the “Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator” (series
GDPDEF) and is seasonally adjusted. Employment refers to “All Employees: Total Nonfarm Employees
(Thousands of Persons)” (series PAYEMS) and is seasonally adjusted. It is logged and HP-filtered with
penalty 1600 . For expositional clarity, I have scaled up its cyclical component (dashed line) by 50 . Consumer
Sentiment (dot-dashed line) refers to “University of Michigan: Consumer Sentiment” (series UMCSENT1,
UMCSENT) and is not seasonally adjusted. For expositional clarity, I have scaled it down by 75 .
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a positive purely expectational shock for φy = 0.5
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to a positive purely expectational shock for φy = 0
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Figure 5: Impulse responses to a positive permanent productivity shock for φy = 0.5
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Figure 6: Impulse responses to a positive permanent productivity shock for φy = 0
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Figure 7: Welfare difference in consumption equivalence terms in response to changes in φpi
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Figure 8: Welfare difference in consumption equivalence terms in response to changes in φy
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